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REACIDNG THE GLASS USURY CEILING: 
WHY STATE CEll..INGS AND FEDERAL PREEMPTION 
FORCE LOW-INCOME BORROWERS INTO 
SUBPRIME MORTGAGE LOANS 
Anne Balcer Nortont 
Consider Jane. l Jane inherited the deteriorating home that her 
parents owned on Baltimore's North Avenue for ten years. When the 
time comes for Jane and her three children to take possession of the 
home, the balance of her parents' first mortgage is $33,000. She real-
izes that she needs to replace the broken hot water heater, repair the 
leaking roof, and fix several cracked windows. Jane is employed as a 
nurse's aid in a retirement home. She lives paycheck to paycheck, has 
no savings and does not know where to turn. The only lending institu-
tion in her neighborhood is "The Green Store," where she has re-
ceived occasional "payday" loans. "The Green Store" is willing to 
grant her a mortgage loan for the $11,000 needed for repairs but only 
if Jane agrees to refinance the entire mortgage of the home, payoff 
other unsecured debt, and take on a new first mortgage at "The 
Green Store's" assessed value of $88,000. The monthly payments 
double, and the undisclosed fees and points that she is charged on the 
loan far exceed what she can truly afford. Nonetheless, following 
daily phone calls from the loan officer and without any other options, 
Jane agrees and authorizes the transaction. 
The story of Jane is not unique; it is a scenario that low-income 
homeowners face in neighborhoods across the country.2 Income 
level, race, and demographics have made subprime lending institu-
t Anne Balcer Norton was the staff attorney for St. Anlbrose Housing Aid 
Center in Baltimore, Maryland, where she served as the Interim Program 
Director for the Legal Services program until this past August. Most 
recently, Anne developed the Foreclosure Prevention and Intervention 
Pilot Program at St. Anlbrose. Anne is grateful for the in-depth critique 
and support of Professors Charles Shafer and Robert Durocher, from the 
University of Baltimore School of Law, as well as that from Maria Stacy, St. 
Anlbrose Housing Aid Center's paralegal "extraordinaire." 
1. The story of Jane is not a true story. 'jane's" circumstances are a compila-
tion of those affecting the various clients that come to St. Anlbrose Housing 
Aid Center in Baltimore, Maryland for loan default counseling and legal 
representation. See St. Anlbrose Housing Aid Center, http://www.st 
ambros.org. 
2. Peggy Twohig, Prepared Statement of the Federal Trade Commission 
before the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System pt. 2 (Sept. 7, 
2000), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/09/Predatorylending.htm. 
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tions, such as "The Green Store," the replacement for conventional 
banks in deteriorating communities.3 Congress's enactment of the 
Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act4 
(DIDMCA), in 1980, promulgated the growth of such subprime 
lending.5 
This Article will focus on subprime borrowers, specifically borrow-
ers taking home equity or non-purchase money loans for their proper-
ties. Part I will examine the low-income borrower as a borrower in the 
subprime market and the prevalence of home equity lending therein. 
Part II discusses the predatory practices of numerous subprime lend-
ing institutions and the consequences of such practices. Part III out-
lines usury laws, specifically the laws of Maryland and Pennsylvania, 
enacted to protect vulnerable borrowers but negated by Congress's 
enactment of the DIDMCA. Part IV discusses strategies for shattering 
the iniquitous glass ceiling of usury laws. 
I. INTRODUCTION TO THE SUBPRIME BORROWER 
A. Low Income Borrower as a Subprime Borrower 
Borrowers labeled as "high risk" are frequently barred access to 
loans at conventional rates6 and are often steered into the arms of 
subprime lenders.7 In many cases, accepting a subprime loan is the 
borrower's only access to credit.8 These borrowers often have a high 
debt to income ratio, little to no credit history, or poor credit.9 The 
majority of subprime borrowers share similar characteristics. Borrow-
ers are from low- to moderate-income families living in the poorest 
census tracks.lO Additionally, the majority of borrowers dispropor-
tionately come from minority groups.l1 Unfortunately, subprime bor-
3. Borrowers who do not qualify for a "prime" rate mortgage loan, because of 
poor or damaged credit, are charged a higher rate "subprime" loan. Tania 
Davenport, Note, An American Nightmare: Predatory Lending in the Subprime 
Home Mortgage Industry, 36 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 531, 532 (2003). Lenders in 
both markets assess a borrower's ability to repay the loan based on income, 
assets, and credit score when setting the rate charged. Id. 
4. Pub. L. No. 96-221,94 Stat. 132 (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 12 U.S.C.). 
5. See infra notes 72-81 and accompanying text. 
6. The term "conventional rate" is being used to describe prime rates offered 
by conventional lenders. 
7. See Davenport, supra note 3, at 532. 
8. Id. 
9. Id. 
10. KENNETH TEMKIN ET AL., PREPARED FOR U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., 
SUBPRIME MARKETS, THE ROLE OF GSEs AND RISK-BASED PRICING 6 (2002) 
[hereinafter HUD Study], available at http://www.huduser.org/Publica-
tions/pdflSubprime.pdf. 
II. Id. In fact, in 1998 the Department of Housing and Urban Development 
(HUD) found that "sub prime loans accounted for 51 percent of the dollar 
amount of all refinance loans in predominantly black census tracts." Id. 
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rowers are typically uninformed. I2 Most are likely to respond to an 
advertisement or telephone call and few do preparatory research 
before entering into the transaction. I3 
B. Why Low Income Borrowers Turn to the Subprime Market I4 
Borrowers, such as those described above, aspiring to purchase a 
home, make improvements to their home, or consolidate debt are 
often only able to receive a mortgage loan through a subprime lender. 
This is the case for several reasons. First, banks have fled at alarming 
rates from the neighborhoods where most subprime borrowers re-
side. I5 Second, it is my impression that conventional lenders are una-
ble to make second mortgage loans (i.e., home equity loans) 16 to high 
12. THE REINVESTMENT FUND, MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE FILINGS IN PENN-
SYLVANIA: A STUDY BY THE REINVESTMENT FUND FOR THE PENNSYLVANIA DE-
PARTMENT OF BANKING 74 (2005) [hereinafter PA Study], available at http:/ / 
www.trfund.com/about! publications / pa % 20foreclosures / Mortgage % 20 
Forclosure%20Filings.pdf. 
13. [d. It is important to note that subprime lenders target certain borrowers 
through advertising in unconventional media, such as Ameriquest Mort-
gage's sponsorship of drag racing in Chicago, Ameriquest Mortgage to sponsor 
fall Chicago event, NAT'L DRAGSTER, March 18, 2005, at 4, http://www.find 
articles.com/p/articles/mi_qa4078/is_200503/ai_n13476006, and Argent 
Mortgage's sponsorship of an Indy Grand Prix race in California, Infineon 
Raceway, Argent Mortgage Indy Car Grand Prix, http://www.infineonrace 
way.com/ news/ argencmortgage_indy _car ....grand_prix/ 485487 .html (last 
visited Nov. 11,2005). 
14. Federal law exists to educate and assist borrowers to "shop around" and 
avoid unfavorable transactions prior to closing. Lenders must comply with 
the requirements set forth in the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act 
(RESPA), 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601-17 (2000), and the Truth in Lending Act 
(TILA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-67f (2000). Unfortunately, the practical conse-
quences of such legislation provide little assistance to the subprime bor-
rower. The mortgage related disclosures required under the TlLA are 
meant to offer the borrower the opportunity to shop around for a better 
transaction. This has little effect on a subprime borrower with little access 
to any other credit. Additionally, both RESPA and TILA are disclosure stat-
utes and the information they require to be disclosed is only made available 
to the borrower shortly before closing. Kimm Tynan, Pennsylvania Welcomes 
Predatory Lenders: Pennsylvania's Act 55 Preempts Philadelphia's Tough Ordinance 
But Provides Little Protection For Vulnerable Borrowers, 34 RUTGERS LJ. 837, 867, 
869 (2003); see, e.g., Rendler v. Corus Bank, 272 F.3d 992, 995 (7th Cir. 
2001). 
15. This assertion is a brief introduction to the widespread problem of bank 
flight from the inner city. In many cases, these banks are replaced by check 
cashing facilities. I will not explore this idea in great detail, but it is a factor 
that must be mentioned when analyzing the growth of the subprime mar-
ket. For a discussion of this problem, see, for example, Robert D. Bullard, 
Glenn S.Johnson & Angel O. Torres, The Costs and Consequences of Suburban 
Sprawl: The Case of Metro Atlanta, 17 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 935, 947-48 (2001); 
Alvin C. Harrell, Commentary, The Case for Consumer Litigation, Part Two-
Limitations of the Regulatory Alternative, 52 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REp. 364,402 
(Fall 1998). 
16. For the purposes of this paper, "home equity lending" refers to loans, other 
than loans for purchase (nonpurchase money loans), that are lent on the 
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risk borrowers at a rate that falls within the prescribed usury rate for a 
given state.17 Third, aggressive subprime lenders are willing to accept 
this allegedly higher risk in exchange for higher profit.1s An addi-
tional characteristic of subprime lending worth discussion is that the 
majority of subprime loans are not lent based on the borrower's ability 
to repay, rather, many subprime loans are made solely because of the 
equity in the homeowner's home.19 
C. Home Equity Loans 
Homeowners can borrow money leveraging the equity III their 
homes despite their income or creditworthiness. Borrowers may 
choose a home equity loan to make home repairs, essentially increas-
ing the home's value, or consolidate other unsecured debt or make a 
major purchase, essentially stripping its value, based on available eq-
uity. A home equity loan is a second lien on a property; seventy-five 
percent of all subprime loans in 1999, however, were first liens.20 As 
discussed in Part III, subprime lenders refinance the entire debt of 
both the mortgage and the additional expenditures into one first 
mortgage at a much higher cost to the borrower.21 Not only will the 
borrower pay more over the life of the loan, but the subprime lender 
secures a first lien position on the borrower's home.22 This presents a 
higher likelihood of the borrower losing the home to foreclosure in 
the event of default.23 Borrowers unable to repay high rate first mort-
equity in the borrower's home. A. Mechele Dickerson, Bankruptcy and Mort-
gage Lending: The Homeowner Dilemma, 38 J. MARsHALL L. REv. 19, 23 (2004). 
Traditionally, these loans take the form of a second lien on the property 
and are, therefore, referred to as a second mortgage. While researching 
this topic, I found that the terminology "home equity loan" or "second 
mortgage loan" have different meanings within different industries. For 
example, mortgage brokers and lenders define "home equity loans" 
broadly to include "home equity lines of credit," "debt consolidation," or 
"home improvement loans," specifically. Most professionals in the mort-
gage industry do not consider a refinance loan a home equity loan or a 
second mortgage loan because refinance loans take the form of a first mort-
gage lien. 
17. See infra Part III. 
18. Abraham B. Putney, Rules, Standards, and Suitability: Finding the Correct Ap-
proach to Predatory Lending, 71 FORDHAM L. REv. 2101, 2105 (2003). 
19. Elizabeth Laderman, Subprime Mortgage Lending and the Capital Markets, 
FRBSF ECONOMIC LETTER, No. 2001-38 (Research Dep't, Fed. Reserve Bank 
of S.F., S.F., Cal.), Dec. 28, 2001. 
20. Id. at 1. As discussed infra Part III, a first lien on a property is exempt from 
state usury limits under the DIDMCA. 
21. See infra notes 81-87. 
22. See infra Part III.C.2. 
23. See infra note 30. See, for example, PA Study, supra note 12, at 1, for a 
discussion relating to the likelihood of purchase money loans to end in 
foreclosure. 
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gage loans can do little to cure the delinquency.24 The lender, secur-
ing a first lien position, can immediately foreclose on the debtor's 
home and seize its securitized asset.25 
The threat of foreclosure is rea1.26 When borrowers refinance a 
lesser second mortgage into a first mortgage through a subprime 
lender, the monthly payment becomes greater, perhaps far in excess 
of what it would have been to maintain two separate loans.27 Further-
more, because the borrower was most likely approved for the loan be-
cause of the home's equity, the borrower may not be able to repay the 
debt at all.28 At that point, all of the borrower's debts, both secured 
and unsecured, put the homeowner in jeopardy of losing her single 
largest asset-her home.29 
11. PREDATORY PRACTICES OF SUBPRIME LENDING30 
The mortgage transaction is one that is highly complicated for even 
the savviest consumer.31 Aggressive sales tactics and a total disregard 
for the borrower's ability to make future payments are characteristics 
of predatory lending.32 Subprime lenders, like conventional lenders, 
24. See Elizabeth Renuart, Staff Attorney, Nat'l Consumer Law Ctr., Testimony 
Before the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Regarding Home 
Equity Lending and HOEPA (Aug. 4, 2000), available at http://www.nclc. 
org/initiatives/predatory_mortgage/ content/hoepajl_content.html. But 
see 24 C.F.R. § 203.355 (2005). HUD affords borrowers with Federal Hous-
ing Authority (FHA)-insured loans additional protections prior to foreclo-
sure. Id. HUD further has the authority to modify or mitigate the 
foreclosure of FHA-insured loans. See U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., 
HANDBOOK 4330.1 REv-5, para. 8-1 (1994), available at http://www.hudclips. 
org/ sub_nonhud/ cgi/hudclipsJun.cgi?hudclipsJun (follow "Chapter 8. 
HUD-Approved Relief Provisions" hyperlink). 
25. See Laderman, supra note 19, at 1. 
26. See infra note 51 and accompanying text. 
27. See infra note 51 and accompanying text. 
28. See Davenport, supra note 3, at 543. 
29. See id. As a result of the new loan, previously unsecured debt or consumer 
purchases that could have been repossessed are now secured by the bor-
rower's property. 
30. Harold Levine, A Day in the Life of a Residential Mmtgage Defendant, 36 J. 
MARsHALL L. REv. 687, 688 (2003) (" 'Predatory Lending' has been de-
scribed as a catalog of onerous lending practices often targeting vulnerable 
populations and resulting in devastating personal losses, including bank-
ruptcy, and the loss of people's home."); see also Ronald H. Silverman, To-
ward Curing Predatory Lending, 122 BANKING LJ. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 483,495 & 
n.34 (2005). But see Davenport, supra note 3, at 533 ("Not all subprime 
loans are predatory, and not all subprime lending practices are unfair or 
abusive."). The higher rates, prepayment penalties, and default provisions 
associated with subprime loans exist to protect the lender taking a higher 
risk in extending the loan. Furthermore, "a subprime lender can assist a 
borrower in purchasing a home or in refinancing for home repairs or con-
sumer credit debt reduction when prime lenders would refuse to do so." 
Id. at 532-33. 
31. Putney, supra note 18, at 2104 & n.17. 
32. Putney, supra note 18, at 2105. 
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offer a wide range of products from loans for purchases or refinanc-
ing, to home equity lines of credit and home improvement loans.33 
Unlike conventional lenders" though, the rates offered by subprime 
lenders vary substantially.34 The lack of underwriting standards or re-
porting guidelines for subprime lenders culminates in this variance.35 
Additionally, current interest rates and points for particular loans 
available in the conventional market are published widely in print and 
electronic media.36 In contrast, subprime lenders provide rate sheets 
that are only available to mortgage brokers, the terms of which 
change quickly, and at times, these tables are protected from public 
dissemination as "trade secrets."37 
Not all subprime lenders are predatory lenders.38 Without consis-
tent regulatory oversight, it is difficult to track the particular lenders 
that prey on the vulnerable.39 Predatory loans are characterized as 
those in which the borrower is charged excessive rates, despite the 
borrower's favorable credit; high fees, including hidden fees and 
"kickbacks";40 as well as lofty discount points.41 Four other abusive 














See Cathy Lesser Mansfield, The Road to Subprime "HEL" Was Paved With 
Good Congressional Intentions: Usury Deregulation and the Subprime Home l!.quity 
Market, 51 S.C. L. REv. 473, 557-58 (2000). 
Id. at 535. 
Id. at 559. 
See, e.g., The Baltimore Sun Mortgage Guide, BALT. SUN, Feb. 19, 2006, at IlL 
(providing a weekly print statement of mortgage interest rates). 
See PA Study, supra note 12, at 74. 
See supra note 30. 
See Davenport, supra note 3, at 552. 
See Mansfield, supra note 33, at 534-35. 
"Discount points are a percentage of the loan paid up front by the bor-
rower and are typically associated with a buy-down of the interest rate." 
Paul Hendry II, Comment, Home l!.quity Lending in Texas: Are Loan Origina-
tion Fees Interest?, 10 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REv. 259, 365 (2003). These points 
are nothing more than a bonus to the lender. 
See Davenport, supra note 3, at 534; see also U.S. DEP'T. OF Hous. & URBAN 
DEV. & U.S. DEP'T. OF TREASURY, CURBING PREDATORY HOME MORTGAGE 
LENDING 2 (2000), available at http://www.huduser.org/Publications/pdf/ 
treasrpt. pdf. 
Davenport, supra note 3, at 542 ("Loan flipping occurs when a lender forces 
a borrower to refinance a loan repeatedly over a short period of time. A 
borrower is especially vulnerable to loan flipping when in danger of fore-
closure .... "). Unfortunately for the borrower, "[e]ach time the lender 
flips the loan, the lender charges additional fees, prepayment penalties, 
[and] closing costs .... " Id. For a discussion of loan flipping that results 
from borrowers holding balloon notes, see Silverman, supra note 30, at 499-
500. 
Loan packing occurs when a lender "adds unnecessary charges and services 
to the loan amouTlt without the borrower's understanding or consent. 
Packing often entails charging additional fees for services such as life, disa-
bility, or credit insurance ... unrelated to the original loan .... " Daven-
port, supra note 3, at 542. 
Equity stripping occurs when the lender: 
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and fraud. 46 
Unlike the subprime market, the prime mortgage market acts as 
one of almost self-regulation.47 Published rates and high competition 
keep costs and fees for borrowers 10w.48 Accordingly, default rates are 
10wer.49 These self-regulatory-type protections are less prevalent 
within the subprime market.50 Consequently, foreclosure has proven 
to be a natural consequence of subprime lending. 51 Conventional 
loans foreclosed at a rate that was 1/12 of that of subprime loans dur-
ing the second quarter of 2003.52 Recently, in Pennsylvania, 60-75% 
of the sampled loans that were in foreclosure were originated by sub-
prime lenders. 53 
In a letter dated December 1, 2003, from the National Consumer 
Law Center to Chairman Michael Oxley of the House Financial Ser-
vices Committee entitled "The Skyrocketing Foreclosure Rate Caused 
by Subprime Mortgages," Managing Attorney, Margot Saunders, 
stated: 
[F] oreclosures are increasing over the long term-not quar-
ter to quarter, but each year. The [Mortgage Bankers Associ-
ation] is taking the position that mortgage lending that leads 
to high foreclosure rates is acceptable because it is known to 
be high risk. We are challenging the acceptability of this 
point. At what point does lending which stands a high risk of 
causing the loss of a family's home become unacceptable? 
. .. Should it be legal for mortgage lending to be permitted 
with the anticipated risk that the family will stand a 20% 
chance of losing its home?54 
'strips' the equity in the borrower's home by making a loan based 
solely on the amount of equity in the home rather than on the 
borrower's ability to repay the loan. In equity stripping situations 
the predatory lender is frequently aware that the borrower does 
not have the ability to repay the loan and simply awaits the oppor-
tunity for foreclosure. 
Davenport, supra note 3, at 543. 
46. Davenport, supra note 3, at 543-44 (cataloging various fraudulent 
practices) . 
47. See PA Study, supra note 12, at 71. 
48. [d. 
49. [d. 
50. See generally Mansfield, supra note 33, at 559. 
51. PA Study, supra note 12, at 1. 
52. Letter from Margot Saunders, Managing Attorney, Nat'l Consumer Law 
Ctr., to Rep. Michael Oxley, Chairman, Fin. Servs. Comm., U.S. House of 
Reps. & Rep. Barney Frank, Ranking Member, Fin. Servs. Comm., U.S. 
House of Reps. (December 1, 2003) [hereinafter Saunders Letter], http:/ / 
www.nclc.org/initiatives/predatory_mortgage/ oxley_letter.shtml (last vis-
ited Nov. 11,2005). 
53. PA Study, supra note 12, at 1. 
54. Saunders Letter, supra note 52. 
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Nonetheless, Congress has been slow to address the growing number 
of foreclosures that plague subprime borrowers throughout this 
country. 55 
III. STATE USURY LAWS WERE ENACTED TO PROTECT A VUL-
NERABLE CLASS OF BORROWERS FROM UNCONSCIONA-
BLE INTEREST RATES 
A. Maryland Usury Law 
Throughout early history, the taking of interest in any form was pro-
hibited.56 Western civilizations eventually ended this prohibition but 
placed limits on the amount of interest one could charge.57 Gener-
ally, the laws of usury in this country are governed by individual state 
law.58 In Maryland, usury is an offense that has been condemned by 
the courts throughout its judicial history. 59 The Gilbert Law Diction-
ary defines usury as "[t]he lending of funds at an exorbitant rate or at 
a rate above that permitted by law."60 The Annotated Code of Mary-
land defines usury as "the charging of interest by a lender in an 
amount which is greater than that allowed by this subtide."61 Lenders 
in Maryland may not charge simple interest62 "in excess of 8 percent 
per year on the unpaid principal balance of a loan."63 For secondary 
mortgage loans,64 lenders may not exceed a rate of sixteen percent.65 
A loan that exceeds the eight percent maximum interest rate may 
escape liability, despite this State's usury limitations, based on the ex-
55. [d. 
56. SeeJonathan R. Macey, Geoffrey P. Miller & Richard Scott Carnell, Banking 
Law and Regulation 156 (3d ed. 2001) [hereinafter Banking Law and 
Regulation] . 
57. [d. at 157. 
58. [d. 
59. See, e.g., Wetter v. Hardesty, 16 Md. 11, 15 (1860); Wilson v. Russell, 13 Md. 
494 (1859); Robertson v. Am. Homestead Ass'n, 10 Md. 397 (1857). 
60. GILBERT LAw SUMMARIES, LAw DICTIONARY (1997). Despite the "exorbitant" 
label, in the mid-1990's, conventional loan rates averaged 6.71 % to 8.32%, 
while subprime rates averaged 10.54% to 14.049%. Mansfield, supra note 
33, at 537. 
61. MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw § 12-101(k) (LexisNexis 2005). 
62. Simple interest is defined as "interest charged on the principal amount 
loaned the borrower." [d. § 12-101(i); see also B.F. Saul Co. v. West End 
Park N., Inc., 250 Md. 707, 717, 246 A.2d 591, 598 (1968). 
63. MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw § 12-103(a) (LexisNexis 2005). 
64. A secondary mortgage loan is a loan: 
secured in whole or in part by a mortgage, deed of trust, security 
agreement, or other lien on real property located in the State, 
which property: 
(i) Is subject to the lien of one or more prior encumbrances, 
except a ground rent or other leasehold interest; and 
(ii) Has a dwelling on it designed principally as a residence 
with accommodations for not more than four families. 
[d. § 12-401(i). 
65. [d. § 12-404(b). 
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ceptions carved out in the statute.66 Section 12-103(b) of the Com-
mercial Law Article permits a lender to charge any amount of interest 
when the loan is a first mortgage loan on the property, and the lender 
is an institution that is subject to the provisions of § 501 (a) (1) of the 
DIDMCA.67 
B. Pennsylvania Usury Law 
Pennsylvania enacted the Residential Mortgage Act to offer a more 
flexible interest rate for mortgage loans.68 The terms of the law, codi-
fied at 41 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 301, supersede the otherwise six percent 
state cap.69 The Residential Mortgage Act sets the usury rate for mort-
gage loans at two and a half percent above the monthly index on long 
term United States Government Bonds.70 Despite this more flexible 
cap, like Maryland, loans covered by the National Bank Act are ex-
empt from compliance.71 
C. The Depository Institutions DerefJUlation and Monetary Control Act 
Preempts State Usury Law. 
1. The Act and its Purpose 
Section 501 (a) of the DIDMCA, as amended, preempts state usury 
rates, and provides that state laws limiting the amount of interest 
charged on mortgages or credit sales secured by a first lien on the 
borrower's property do not apply to federally related mortgage 
66. Id. § 12-103(b)-(f). 





(1) A lender may charge interest at any effective rate of simple 
interest on the unpaid principal balance of a loan if: 
(ii) The loan is secured by a first mortgage or first deed of 
trust on any interest in residential real property; 
(v) The loan is not a refinancing of a loan secured by a first 
mortgage or first deed of trust on any interest in residential real 
property unless: 
1. The lender is a banking institution, a national banking asso-
ciation, a federal savings bank, a federal or State savings and loan 
association, or a federal or State credit union; or 
2. The loan is subject to the provisions of § 501 (a)(l) of the 
Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 
1980 .... 
Id. (emphasis added). 
David L. Schwalm, Comment, Usury in Pennsylvania: Revision of Maximum 
Interest Rate and Finance Charge Laws, 84 DICK. L. REv. 241, 246 (1980). 
Compare 41 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 41, § 301(b) (West 1999) (setting the maxi-
mum rate of interest for residential mortgages), with id. § 201(b) ("Except 
as provided in Article III of this Act, the maximum lawful rate of interest ... 
shall be six per cent per annum."). 
Schwalm, supra note 68, at 246. 
Schwalm, supra note 68, at 260 n.130 (states cannot apply their own usury 
limits to an out-of-state national bank). 
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loans.72 Federally related mortgage loans are loans extended by insti-
tutions that are federally insured, or regulated in part, by a federal 
regulatory body as described in § 527(b) of the National Housing 
Act.73 Congress enacted the DIDMCA during a period of skyrocketing 
mortgage interest rates-rates that in many cases exceeded state usury 
limits.74 As a result, Congress felt that savings banks could not com-
pete with other financial institutions, and by enacting the DIDMCA, 
created a "stable national financial system."75 Section 501 was enacted 
"'to ease the severity of the mortgage credit crunches of recent years' 
by removing artificial disruptions in the national mortgage lending 
market caused by restrictive state laws.,,76 Congress did, nonetheless, 
give states the opportunity to opt out of the preemption during a pre-
72. 12 U.S.C. § 1735f-7a(a) (1) (West 2000). 
73. The DIDMCA provides: 
(1) The provisions of the constitution or the laws of any State ex-
pressly limiting the rate or amount of interest ... shall not apply to 
any ... mortgage, credit sale, or advance which is-
(A) secured by a first lien on residential real property 
(C) described in section 527(b) of the National Housing Act. Id. 
§ 527(b) of the National Housing Act states: 
(b) For purposes of subsection (a) of this section, the term 
"federally related mortgage loan" means any loan which-
(1) is secured by residential real property designed princi-
pally for the occupancy of from one to four families; and 
(2) (A) is made in whole or in part by any lender the de-
posits or accounts of which are insured by any agency of the 
Federal Government, or is made in whole or in part by any 
lender which is itself regulated by any agency of the Federal 
Government; or 
(B) is made in whole or in part, or insured, guaranteed, 
supplemented, or assisted in any way, by the Secretary of Hous-
ing and Urban Development or any other officer or agency of 
the Federal Government or under or in connection with a 
housing or urban development program administered by the 
Secretary of Housing and Urban Development or a housing or 
related program administered by any other such officer or 
agency; or 
(C) is eligible for purchase by the Federal National Mort-
gage Association, the Government National Mortgage Associa-
tion, or the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, or 
from any financial institution from which it could be pur-
chased by the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation; or 
(D) is made in whole or in part by any "creditor," as de-
fined in section 1602(f) of Title 15, who makes or invests in resi-
dential real estate loans aggregating more than $1,000,000 per 
year. 
12 U.S.c. § 1735f-5(b). 
74. Basis Points, Section 501 Preempts California Restriction on l'Wzen Interest Can 
Accrue, http://www.docmagic.com/compliance/basispoints/05-03.pdf (last 
visited Nov. 11,2005). 
75. Id. 
76. 73 Md. Op. Att'y Gen. 144, 151 (1988) (quoting S. REp. No. 96-368, at 18 
(1979), as reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 236, 254). 
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scribed window of time.77 Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, 
Maine, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, Puerto Rico, 
South Carolina, South Dakota, and Wisconsin were the only states to 
do SO.78 
2. The Growth of Subprime Lending Following the DIDMCA 
Subprime mortgage lending grew substantially following the enact-
ment of the DIDMCA.79 In 2000, $140 billion was generated by the 
origination of subprime loans, compared to only $35 billion in 1994,80 
and $7 billion in 1990.81 Subprime mortgages for single-family resi-
dential mortgage debt were reported at $370 billion in 1999.82 Sev-
enty-six percent of subprime lending in 1999 was based on home 
equity lending, however, about three-fourths of all subprime loans 
originated in the same year held the first lien position.83 As noted 
above, many subprime borrowers utilize equity in their homes to se-
cure a mortgage, preferably a second mortgage, through home equity 
loans in order to payoff other debt or make home repairs.84 These 
individuals would not qualify for second mortgage loans from lending 
institutions that are obligated to stay within the state usury caps on 
non-first lien mortgages.85 Consequently, unscrupulous lenders have 
used this preemption to wrap second mortgage debt into a new first 
mortgage lien.86 In doing so, instead of extending a small second 
mortgage, i.e., in the form of a home improvement loan, the lender 
refinances the entire first and second mortgage debt into one "first" 
lien package.87 By doing so, qualifying lenders preempt state law.88 
This scenario is illustrative of many in which a conventional lender 
would not be able to offer a second mortgage loan to a subprime bor-
77. Donna S. Harkness, Predatory Lending Prevention Project: Prescribing a Cure for 
the Home Equity Loss Ailing the Elderly, 10 B.U. PUB. INT. LJ. 1, 27 (2000). 
78. Id. at 27 n.166. 
79. Laderman, supra note 19, at 1-2. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 also led to 
the growth of sub prime mortgage lending. Id. The Act permitted consum-
ers to deduct interest paid on loans secured by their homes and ended the 
deductions on consumer interest. Id. 
80. Id. 
81. Mansfield, supra note 33, at 528. 
82. Silverman, supra note 30, at 493-94. 
83. Laderman, supra note 19, at 1. 
84. See supra Part I.C. 
85. See infra Part IV.C. 
86. Mike Hudson, Stealing Home: How the Government and Big Banks Help Second 
Mortgage Companies Prey on the Poor, 26 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 1476, 1480 
(1993). 
87. Id. 
88. 12 U.S.C. § 1735f-7a(a) (l) (West 2000) (stating that state laws that limit 
interest rates or other charges shall not apply to any loan or mortgage se-
cured by a first lien). But see Sweeney v. Sav. First Mortgage, LLC, 388 Md. 
319,338,879 A.2d 1037, 1048 (2005) (mortgage brokers are not "qualifying 
lenders" able to preempt Maryland law). 
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rower within the limits of a given usury ceiling, yet, the subprime 
lender circumvents the law by creating a new first lien on the 
property.89 
3. Home Equity Lending90 
As a result of the DIDMCA, the only regulation on loan interest 
rates for first lien mortgages is the market itself.91 Debt consolidation, 
home improvement loans, and other forms of home equity loans can 
have unlimited rates of interest as long as the loan takes the form of a 
first lien position on the borrower's residential property.92 The popu-
larity of home equity lending has grown substantially in recent years. 
In 1983, 6.8% of homeowners had home equity debt, which grew to 
11 % in 1988, and 15% in 1989.93 In 1999, home equity lending ac-
counted for seventy-six percent of loans originated by subprime lend-
ers.94 These numbers do not include refinancing debt; many 
homeowners paid off existing mortgages and other debt, utilizing the 
equity in their homes and often at rates exceeding that of the prior 
first mortgage.95 Also, it is worth noting that sixty-eight percent of 
home equity loans were used to payoff other consumer debt in 1993 
and 1994, a sharp rise from thirty-five percent in 1988.96 Additionally, 
because these loans were made by subprime lenders securing a first 
lien position on the borrower's property, the borrower's monthly pay-
ments also rose sharply.97 
a. Increased Foreclosure Rates for Subprime Loans98 
The effects of the growth of subprime home equity lending in the 
mid-nineties has since come to fruition in recent years.99 Specifically, 
the consequences of default when a home equity loan secures a first 
89. See 12 U.S.C. § 1735f-7a(a)(1). 
90. Prior to the growth in popularity of the DIDMCA, home equity loans 
"which were being made mostly to prime borrowers, were still cast mostly as 
second mortgages and tended to have lower balances, shorter maturities, 
and low combined loan to value ratios .... " Mansfield, supra note 33, at 
523. 
91. Id. at 542-43. 
92. Id. 
93. Id. at 522-23. 
94. Laderman, supra note 19 (About seventy-five percent ofloans originated by 
subprime lenders in 1999 were first lien loans). See supra note 79 and ac-
companying text. 
95. Laderman, supra note 19. 
96. Mansfield, supra note 33, at 524. 
97. See Temkin et aI., supra note 8 (quoting U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. AND URBAN 
DEV. & U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, CURBING PREDATORY LENDING REpORT 31 
(2000», available at http://www.huduser.org/publications/pdf/treasrpt. 
pdf. 
98. See supra Part II for a discussion of predatory practices that lead to 
foreclosure. 
99. Mansfield, supra note 33, at 554. 
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lien position on a homeowner's property are devastating. loo As dis-
cussed in Part I, many of the loans are made based on the equity in 
the borrower's home without regard to the borrower's ability to repay 
the loan.101 When a homeowner borrows against the equity in the 
home, the loan-to-value ratio rises. 102 A higher loan-to-value ratio is 
often indicative of increased likelihood of foreclosure. 109 In some 
cases, borrowers borrowing against home equity cannot even afford to 
pay the first monthly payment.104 
Default and foreclosure have become increasingly common in the 
market of subprime lending. l05 A first lien position on the borrower's 
home makes the stakes of default much higher. lOG Unlike 
subordinate lienholders, the foreclosing first mortgagee has few obsta-
cles preventing foreclosure.107 The loss of one's home under such 
circumstances is tragic.108 Among other things, foreclosure can lead 
to the loss of shelter, homelessness, family break-up, overcrowded liv-
ing conditions with relatives willing to provide shelter, and the ab-
sence from school by children relocated after losing their home.109 In 
many cases, the borrower would never be in such a position had it not 
been for her dealings with the subprime lender.no In addition to the 
fact that individual borrowers and families are now homeless and have 
irreparable credit; on a larger scale, neighborhood deterioration also 
results. I II It is inconceivable to think that putting victims of predatory 
transactions out of their homes does not offend the most fundamental 
sensibilities common to communities across the country. "Oddly 
enough, this is the same concern that led Congress into the home 
mortgage market during the Great Depression, and the opposite re-
sult of what Congress intended when it passed DIDMCA."112 
Mortgage fraud and predatory real estate practices lead to vacant 
housing and deteriorating neighborhoods in all metropolitan neigh-
100. [d. at 555. 
101. See supra Part I.A-B. 
102. Julia Patterson Forrester, Mortgaging the American Dream: A Critical Evalua-
tion of the Federal Government's Promotion of Home Equity Financing, 69 TuL. L. 
REv. 373, 382 n.38 (1994) (citing JOHN P. HERZOG &JAMES S. EARLy, HOME 
MORTGAGE DELINQUENCY AND FORECLOSURE xvii-xix (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. 
Research 1970». 
103. [d. (citing JOHN P. HERZOG & JAMES S. EARLy, HOME MORTGAGE DELIN-
QUENCY AND FORECLOSURE, xvii-xix (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research 1970». 
104. Mansfield, supra note 33, at 553 ("[O]n some loan portfolios, 'first payment 
delinquencies' may run as high as 25 percent."). [d. at 553, n.480. 
105. [d. at 553-54. 
106. Forrester, supra note 102, at 385-86. 
107. [d. at 381, n.387 (citing JOHN P. HERZOG & JAMES S. EARLY, supra note 102, 
at xvii-xix). 
108. Forrester, supra note 102, at 385. 
109. See [d. at 386. 
110. Mansfield, supra note 33, at 554. 
Ill. [d. at 555. 
112. [d. 
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borhoods. 113 In Baltimore, subprime lenders originated twenty-one 
percent of all mortgage loans, yet were responsible for forty-five per-
cent of the city's foreclosuresY4 Regardless of neighborhood, 
boarded up and dilapidated homes detrimentally affect the economic 
viability of any communityY5 
b. Disparate Impact on Minorities 
Studies indicate that subprime lenders target minority groupS.116 
The Woodstock Institute published a study showing that "in predomi-
nantly Mrican-American neighborhoods, subprime lenders account 
for 58 percent of conventional [sic] refinance loans, as compared to 
less than 10 percent in predominantly white tracts."117 Additionally, 
in white neighborhoods in 1998, seventeen of twenty lenders for con-
ventional refinancing loans were prime lenders; while eighteen of 
twenty lenders in Mrican American neighborhoods, based on loan ap-
plications, were subprime lenders.118 
IV. BREAKING THE CEILING119 
At a time in which foreclosure rates are rising, neighborhoods are 
in decay, and conventional lending institutions seem to be extinct in 
113. See id. 
114. Twohig, supra note 2. 
115. See Silverman, supra note 30, at 530. 
116. See Mansfield, supra note 33, at 560. 
117. Id. (citing Daniel Immergluck & Marti Wiles, Two STEPS BACK: THE DUAL 
MORTGAGE MARKET, PREDATORY LENDING, AND THE UNDOING OF COMMUNITY 
DEVELOPMENT, 1999 WOODSTOCK INST. 19). 
118. Mansfield, supra note 33, at 560, n.532 (citing Immergluck & Wiles, supra 
note 117, at 30). 
119. It is important to note that Congress enacted the Home Ownership and 
Equity Protection Act (HOEPA) in 1994, in response to predatory lending 
abuses. Pub. L. No. 103-325, 108 Stat. 2190 (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 15 U.S.C.). See also Davenport, supra note 3, at 548 ("In 
specific response to growing problems of predatory lending and concerns 
about TILA's shortcomings as a device to combat practice, Congress 
amended TILA in 1994 by enacting HOEPA."). HOEPA requires specific 
disclosures, including annual percentage rates, monthly payments, and 
loan fees for "high cost closed-end loans secured by the borrower's home 
.... " Id. at 548-49. See HOEPA, Pub. L. No. 103-325, 108 Stat. 2190 (codi-
fied as amended in various sections of 15 U.S.C.). Furthermore, HOEPA 
targets predatory lending by barring common predatory loan terms, such as 
balloon payments, prepayment penalties, increased rates at the time of de-
fault, while mandating additional disclosures to the borrower. Id. Critics 
claim that HOEPA is only a first step at combating predatory lending, and 
that it does not go far enough. Mansfield, supra note 33, at 564-65. In 
addition, HOEPA only applies to high-cost closed-end loans and not 
purchase money loans and open-end credit. See Davenport, supra note 3, at 
549-50. Additionally, the threshold, some have argued, is too high-many 
predatory lenders can continue business as usual, but keep the loan terms 
just below HOEPA trigger points. Id. at 559. Remedies available under 
Pennsylvania's Consumer Equity Protection Act, or Act 55, are less advanta-
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low-income and minority areas,120 clearly, the unintended conse-
quences that have resulted from DIDMCA must be addressed. 121 Un-
fortunately, Congress has failed to take action to remedy the 
consequences of this legislation. 122 
A. Reaction by Certain States 
Immediately following the enactment of the DIDMCA, several states 
had the foresight to affirmatively "opt out" of the statute. 123 Since 
that time, certain states have taken additional preventative steps to 
protect vulnerable borrowers.124 For example, Massachusetts opted 
out of DIDMCA when the Massachusetts Division of Banks "promul-
gated ... [the] High Cost Mortgage Loan Regulations," effective in 
200l. 125 The Massachusetts regulations require certain disclosures 
and prohibits loan flipping or asset-based lending.126 In addition to 
enacting remedial legislation,127 North Carolina extended its "opt 
out" provision, protecting borrowers in Pennsylvania.128 In Flannick v. 
First Union Home Equity Bank, a North Carolina Bank extended a loan 
at a rate exceeding North Carolina's usury limits to Pennsylvania re-
sidents who had visited First Union's processing office in Penn-
geous to borrowers than those available under HOEPA. PA Study, supra 
note 12, at 78. See also § 153, 108 Stat. at 2195-96 (HOEPA enacted an 
entire section addressing damages for violating this provision). On the 
other hand, some argue that a lower HOEPA threshold would lead to more 
expensive loans for borrowers. See PA Study, supra note 12, at 78. 
120. See supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text. 
121. See supra notes 79-88 and accompanying text. 
122. See Mansfield, supra note 33, at 574. 
123. KATHELEEN E. KEEST & ELIZABETH RENUART, The Cost of Credit Regulation and 
Legal Challenges, 104 (Nat'l Consumer Law Ctr. 2d ed. 2000). 
124. Id. at 104, n.354. 
125. Stephen F. Ornstein, MAsSACHUSETTS ENACTS HIGH COST MORTGAGE REGU-
LATIONS, 118 BANKING LJ. 427, 427 (2001). "The significance of the new 
Massachusetts law is that it substantially augments Massachusetts' existing 
provisions addressing 'high cost mortgages' and renders assignees of Massa-
chusetts high cost loans subject to the same penalties that could be asserted 
against the originator." Id. at 428. So, "[i]n other words, the existing 209 
CMR [§] 32.32, which was the Massachusetts version of the federal [sic] 
provisions implementing HOEPA[,] has been replaced, effective March 22, 
2001, by the new provisions of the High Cost Mortgage Regulations." Id. at 
n.1; see 209 MAss. CODE REGs. 32.32 (1987) (version of the Massachusetts 
Code of Regulations that was replaced). 
126. Ornstein, supra note 125, at 433. See also Mansfield, supra note 33, at 553 
("These regulations require disclosures to the borrower ... and strictly pro-
hibit balloon payments, negative amortization, advance payments, and as-
set-based lending ... and prohibit loan flipping .... "). 
127. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24 (2003). 
128. See Flannick v. First Union Home Equity Bank, 134 F. Supp. 2d 389 (E.D. 
Pa. 2001); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-2.33. 
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sylvania.129 The court struck down the loan in violation of North 
Carolina law.130 
The aforementioned examples of state initiatives to neutralize the 
effects of DIDMCA are positive remedial steps. The problem remains, 
however, for those states that did not initially "override" the DIDMCA 
legislation. 131 Practitioners in the field have developed several theo-
ries on the best course of action, other than repealing DIDMCA, to 
remedy its inherent problems.132 
B. Recommendations by Practitioners 
Consumer advocates have called for a change. 133 Recommenda-
tions set forth in one study included increased lending for borrowers 
traditionally labeled as "subprime borrowers" by conventional lenders, 
stronger state and federal regulation to "protect consumers," and 
stricter prosecution and penalties for predatory lending.134 Clearly, 
the subprime borrower is in need of broader protection. 135 One possi-
ble remedy is a federal usury limit on subprime home equity lending, 
or a general federal usury limit for mortgage lending in order to both 
protect unsophisticated borrowers and "prevent[ ] overcompensation 
to lenders," while simultaneoulsy setting a "societal cap" on the value 
of lending money.136 Such arguments rest on the basis that usury lim-
its protect borrowers who are unable "to understand complex finan-
cial transactions," in addition to protecting "loan source funds."137 
Additional protection could come by way of a "floating maximum [in-
terest] rate" set by Congress.138 This type of rate regulation must 
come at the federal level, in order to prevent lenders from "maneu-
ver[ing] around [non-uniform] state regulations."139 
129. 134 F. Supp. 2d 389, 392, 394, 397-98; see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-1.1 (b). 
130. Flannick, 134 F. Supp. 2d at 399; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-1.1 (b) ("Noth-
ing in this section shall be construed to authorize the charging of interest 
on committed funds prior to the disbursement of said funds."). 
131. Flannick, 134 F. Supp. 2d at 389, 392, 394, 397-98. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-
1.1{b). Neither Maryland nor Pennsylvania opted out ofDIDMCA. See MD. 
CODE ANN., COM. LAw § 12-103{b)(l) (v) (2) (LexisNexis 2005); 41 PA. 
STAT. ANN. § 604 (West 1999); see also 73 Md. Op. Att'y Gen. at 147 ("[I]t is 
clear that Maryland has not overridden the federal preemption."). 
132. See Common Dreams, Minority and Low Income Homeowners More Likely 
to Receive High Interest Mortgages; ACORN Study Documents Problem of 
Predatory Lending & "Financial Apartheid" (Nov. 1, 2000), http://www. 
commondreams.org/ news2000 / llO 1-0 I.htm [hereinafter Common Dreams]. 
133. [d. 
134. [d. 
135. See Mansfield, supra note 33, at 573-74. 
136. [d. at 573. 
137. [d. 
138. [d. at 574. 
139. [d. 
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Alternatively, increased protection would result from the elimina-
tion of federal preemption for all nonpurchase money loans.14o 
Through this approach, home equity lending and refinance loans 
would comply with state usury limits. 141 Overall, consumer advocates 
agree that there must be some type of rate regulation protecting 
home equity borrowers in order to alleviate subprime lending 
abuse. 142 
C. This Author's Recommendations: Abolish State Usury Limits143 and En-
force Existing Remedies 144 
Skyrocketing foreclosure rates and the growth of predatory lending 
practices makes clear the need to protect vulnerable home equity bor-
rowers who fall prey to complacent subprime lenders.145 As discussed 
in Parts I and III, typical subprime borrowers cannot get a home eq-
uity loan from a conventional lender; the amount is too little and the 
risk is too high for the bank to be in compliance with state usury regu-
lations.146 That same borrower, left to obtain a loan from a subprime 
lender, does not get the second mortgage loan needed; rather, the 
borrower must take on a costly new first mortgage loan. 147 The sub-
prime lender eludes state usury caps and obtains a first lien position 
on the borrower's home.148 The borrower is unable to pay, defaults 
on the loan, and is left without a home and with irreparable credit.149 
Accordingly, what is necessary is the complete abolishment of existing 
state usury limits for loans secured by real property. At the same time, 
federal agencies must take affirmative steps to enforce the Community 
Reinvestment Act thereby ensuring that banks are located in the 












Forrester, supra note 102, at 447-48. 
Mansfield, supra note 33, at 574. But see Sweeney v. Sav. First Mortgage, 
LLC, 388 Md. 319,338, 879 A.2d 1037, 1048 (2005) (finding that a mort-
gage proposal failed to consider federal jurisdiction over "qualified 
lender[s]"). 
See Mansfield, supra note 33, at 574. 
I am only suggesting the elimination of usury limits as they relate to mort-
gage lending, not in other areas of consumer law. 
See Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, §§ 2901-06 (2001). Other reme-
dies, such as HOEPA, do exist. See supra note 119. But for the purposes of 
this paper, I am focusing on the Community Reinvestment Act. 
See supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text. 
See supra Parts I and III. 
See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text. 
See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text. 
See supra notes 106-11 and accompanying text. 
See 12 U.S.C. § 2901 (West 2000). 
It looks like we still have two separate and very unequal finan-
cial systems. One for the rich and one for the poor. One for 
whites, and one for everyone else. The banks created this situation 
when they abandoned our neighborhoods and opened the door 
for the loan sharks. Now we're finding that these same banks are 
profiting from us through their financing or even ownership of 
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1. The Community Reinvestment Act 
The Community Reinvestment Act (hereinafter "CRA" or "the Act") 
was enacted to guarantee credit opportunities to members of low- and 
moderate-income communities. 151 Since its inception in 1977, the 
Act has sought to ensure access to credit in communities across the 
nation. I52 The CRA specifically prohibits geographical discriminatory 
lending practices and guarantees that access to credit is made availa-
ble for persons of low- and moderate-income within the areas in which 
the banks operate. I53 Traditionally, the banking industry has limited 
credit access to those members of society with the highest incomes. I54 
In the face of such elitism, the CRA was enacted to equalize the dis-
paraging credit opportunities for those in low- to middle-income com-
munities. I55 The goals of the Act are evident in the text of the statute 
itself.I56 "The CRA requires 'appropriate Federal financial supervi-
sory agenc[iesl,' in connection with their examination of financial in-
stitutions, to 'assess the institutions' record of meeting the credit 
needs of its entire community, including low- and moderate-income 
neigh borhoods. . . ." 157 
Regulators, including the Office of the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency, assign a rating to each banking institution based on that bank's 
record of meeting the credit needs of the low- and moderate-income 
members of its community.I58 The rating is considered by such regu-
lators when a bank applies for a new charter, deposit insurance, a new 
branch, or a merger or acquisition. I59 Institutions are required to 
keep CRA information on file and to make it available for the 
pubJic. 160 
these predatory lenders ... [w]e know that many of the people 
who got subprime loans could have qualified for a lower cost mort-
gage, but instead they were pushed into a higher cost loan because 
the mortgage company saw an opportunity to make more money. 
Common Dreams, supra note 132. 
151. Banking Law and Regulation, supra note 56, at 186. 
152. [d. See also 12 U.S.C. § 2901 (b) (stating the purpose of the Act is to "help 
meet the credit needs of the local communities ). 
153. See Marcia Johnson, JaPaula Kemp & Anh Nguyen, The Community Reinvest-
ment Act: Expanding Access, 12 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 89, 89 (Fall 2002). 
154. [d. at 89-90. 
155. See id. at 89; Banking Law and Regulation, supra note 56, at 186. See also 12 
U.S.C. § 2901 (b) (stating that the purpose of the statute is "to encourage 
such institutions to help meet the credit needs of the local communities in 
which they are chartered consistent with the safe and sound operation of 
such institutions"). 
156. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901, 2903, 2906. 
157. Banking Law and Regulation, supra note 56, at 186 (quoting 12 U.S.C. 
§ 2903). 
158. [d. at 187. See 12 U.S.C. § 2903(a) (1). 
159. Banking Law and Regulation, supra note 56, at 186-87. See § 2903(a) (2). 
160. Banking Law and Regulation, supra note 56, at 191. 
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Initially, the CRA was an effective tool for regulatory enforce-
ment. 161 Since its inception, however, it has generated a great deal of 
criticism as disadvantaging banking institutions, and was thus contro-
versial to members of Congress.162 Additionally, the emergence of In-
ternet banking will make it difficult for regulators to define a given 
institution's "community" in order to assign a CRA rating. 163 In light 
of the fact that "[f]inancial institutions that offer their services via the 
Internet are not currently regulated by the CRA," the Act has gone 
largely unenforced in recent years. 164 
Discriminatory practices in lending, rising foreclosure rates, and a 
growing subprime industry make enforcement of the CRA more 
needed than ever before.165 If Congress focused on enforcing this 
legislation and requiring, for example, that financial institutions lo-
cated in northeast Baltimore City serve the entire community, includ-
ing low-income residents therein, the CRA would finally serve as an 
effective tool for alleviating the problems that it was enacted to 
address. 166 
2. The J.P. Morgan Chase Example 
In January of 2004, one of the leading subprime lending institu-
tions, J.P. Morgan Chase ("Chase"), took affirmative steps to acquire 
Bank One.167 Prior to these steps, there were a number of complaints 
filed against Chase with various state regulators. 168 Neither Chase, 
nor Bank One, has a clean record when it comes to dealing with sub-
prime borrowers. 169 For example, in 2002, Bank One disclosed its ties 
to "First American Cash Advance," a payday lender in inner city Chi-
161. Id. 
162. Id. at 191, 193-94 (citing Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Com-
munity Reinvestment Act: An Economic Analysis, 79 VA. L. REv. 291, 294-96 
(1993)). 
163. Johnson et ai., supra note 153, at 101-02. 
164. Id. at 102-03 (stating that while institutions "that offer their services via the 
Internet are not currently regulated by the CRA ... developments in on-
line banking ... call for a reevaluation of the CRA"). 
165. See discussion supra Parts I & II. 
166. But see Forrester, supra note 102, for a discussion of banks purchasing 
notes from predatory lenders lending in low-income areas to satisfy the 
Bank's CRA obligation. 
167. Inner City Press & Fair Finance Watch, The]P. Morgan Chase Watch, March 
8, 2004, www.innercitypress.org/jpmchase.html. 
168. Id. 
169. Id. 
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cago. 170 Additionally, Chase has acted as trustee on subprime loans in 
foreclosure for loans serviced by Fairbanks Capital,171 
Bank One, member FDIC, has a number of branches with varying 
CRA rates.172 Chase, evaluated by the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York, received its seventh "Outstanding" rating in a row. 173 Clearly 
there is some disconnect in this rating. In the Bronx alone, Chase 
closed branch after branch in low-income neighborhoods or in neigh-
borhoods just a few blocks from low-income neighborhoods.174 The 
branch on Tremont Avenue closed its doors leaving no Chase branch 
for "twenty or more blocks in any direction."175 Consequently, only 
"one-fIfth of the bank's mortgage applications in the Bronx [come] 
from South Bronx," a poor and economically disparaged community 
in the area. I76 Furthermore, during 2002 in the Boston area, "Chase 
Manhattan Mortgage Corporation denied loan applications from Afri-
can Americans 8.89 times more" often than from whites, while Latinos 
were denied 6.38 times more often. 177 These figures are up from 
1999, when African Americans were denied loans only 2.34 times 
more often than those of white applicants. 178 Additionally, Chase has 
ties to subprime lenders with unscrupulous reputations, in addition to 
Fairbanks, including Centex, Household/Decision One, First Frank-
lin, and NovaStar, which recently received a "cease-and-desist order 
for 'unauthorized mortgage broker activity.">l79 First Franklin's mar-
ket share in Pennsylvania increased from $4,825.3 million in 2003 to 
$14,042.6 million in 2004. 180 Novastar increased from $86.5 million 
to $5,664.1 million during the same time period.18I 
The Chase-Bank One acquisition serves as a clear example of the 
need for reform. In particular, the acquisition illustrates the strategies 
undergone by lenders to avoid the state usury and other lending regu-
170. Id. Applicants receiving a "payday" loan sign a pledge during the transac-
tion, which, in small print, states that the applicant "fully release[s] all par-
ties, companies, their subsidiaries and employees, past or present, from any 
and all liability for any damage that may result. My signature below indi-
cates that for purposes of verification and qualification, I have voluntarily 
waived the protection of all rights to privacy laws." Id. 
171. Id. 
172. See FFIEC Interagency CRA Ratings Search, http://ffiec.gov / cracf/ crarat-
ing/ main.cfm. 
173. JP Morgan Chase Bank Receives "Outstanding" CRA Rating, Feb.5, 2004, 
http://wwwJpmorganchase.com/cm/ cs?pagename=chase/Href&urlname 
=jpmc/ community / cdg/ cra. 
174. Inner City Press & Finance Watch, supra note 167. 
175. Id. 
176. Id. (citing Saul Hansell, Bronx Group Is Challenging A Planned Merger by Chase, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1994, § 1). 
177. Inner City Press & Finance Watch, supra note 167. 
178. Id. 
179. Id. 
180. PA Study, supra note 12, at 71. 
181. Id. 
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lations, utilizing the provisions of DIDMCA. 182 Such strategies 
demonstrate how ineffective state usury limits are,183 as well as the 
need to enforce already existing legislation, primarily the CRA, in 
combating abusive practices by nationallenders. 184 In this example it 
is clear that the existing state usury laws are neutralized by a merger of 
Chase and Bank One. l85 In this example it is also apparent that the 
CRA is the most effective tool in stopping these abusive practices. 186 
In other words, a complete CRA investigation, prior to granting ap-
proval for the acquisition, would set forth a series of examples of 
Chase's failure to meet the needs of its community at large.187 An 
investigation such as this, however, would require looking beyond the 
ledgers located in Chase's Manhattan office and into the communities 
allegedly served.188 The report would reflect the disparities and illus-
trate the flight from urban settings and surging denial rates among 
minorities. l89 Therefore, the acquisition would be barred until reme-
dial measures are taken. Such consequences are at the heart of the 
CRA, and in furtherance of its legislative purpose.190 
3. Reaction to My Recommendation 
The recommendation to abolish usury, set forth above, would be 
more effective than existing consumer remedies have proven to be. l9l 
Under my propsal, enforcement would come from federal regulators' 
assessments of an institution's record of meeting the credit needs of 
low-income members of its community prior to approving an applica-
tion for expansion.192 Rather than leaving unsophisticated and indi-
gent consumers with the burden of detecting a violation and bringing 
an action against the lender, the bank itself would be regulated.193 
182. See, e.g., Diane Hellug, Exposing the Loansharks in Sheep'S Clothing: Why Re-
Regulating the Consumer Credit Market Makes Economic Sense, 80 NOTRE DAME 
L. REv. 1567, 1605, 1608 (2005). When a federally insured depositary is 
acquired by a state institution, that state institution is covered by the Na-
tional Bank Act and enjoys federal preemption under the DIDMCA. See id. 
183. See id. at 1608-09. 
184. See Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, The CRA Implications of Predatory 
Lending, 29 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 1571, 1592-93 (2002). 
185. See id. at 1608. 
186. Id. at 1592-94. 
187. See supra notes 155-57 and accompanying text. 
188. But see supra notes 162-64 and accompanying text. 
189. See supra notes 174-81 and accompanying text. 
190. See supra notes 151-57 and accompanying text. 
191. Compare discussion supra Part IV.C with discussion supra Part IV.B. But see 
Robin A. Morris, Consumer Debt and Usury: A New Rationalefor Usury, 15 PEPP. 
L. REv. 151, 171 (1998) (discussing the benefits of usury laws for 
consumers). 
192. See 12 U.S.c. §§ 2901, 2903(a) (2000); discussion supra Part IV.A. 
193. See 12 U.S.C. § 2903(a). 
Congress has been indefatigable in creating new rights and causes 
of action for consumers in connection with the provision of credit 
.... While usury rules are designed to police the substantive fair-
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Furthermore, proper enforcement of the CRA would bring banks 
back to the neighborhoods most often targeted by subprime lend-
ers.194 To date, banks have vanished from low-income neighborhoods 
at alarming rates, only to be replaced by subprime institutions. 195 En-
forcement of the CRA would ensure that, prior to a bank gaining ap-
proval for expansion, its record of meeting the credit needs of low- to 
moderate-income borrowers would be assessed via a CRA rating. 196 
Approval for expansion would not be granted without a satisfactory 
CRA rating. 197 Therefore, banks wishing to expand would first have 
to serve the credit needs of the borrowers most in need of accessing 
credit.198 As a result, banks which had previously vacated branches in 
the inner city, but maintained an ATM in the same neighborhood and 
had a payday lender subsidiary, or have opened a branch in a wealth-
ier bordering neighborhood, would have to reopen vacant branches 
to generate credit opportunities sufficient to achieve a satisfactory 
CRA rating.199 Greater banking presence will lead to greater access to 
conventional loans for current subprime borrowers.2oo Currently, it is 
suggested that thirty-five percent of subprime borrowers quality for 
conventional loans, but are unaware of it.201 Accordingly, proper en-
forcement of the CRA will require banks to truly serve the communi-
ties in which they exist, including all neighborhoods in those 
communities.202 In urban areas, where wealthy neighborhoods bor-
der low-income neighborhoods, conventional lenders already lending 
to the wealthy homeowners will have to lend to all members of the 
same extended community.203 
There are some obvious areas of concern in the aforementioned 
theory. First, if the CRA has been ineffective in certain circumstances, 
as evidenced by the Chase-Bank One example,204 why should it now 
ness of the bargain under which credit is supplied, the newer rules 
tend to regulate the procedures for the supply of credit, especially 
the disclosures required for banks and other lenders. 
Banking Law and Regulation, supra note 56, at 172. 
194. See supra note 166. 
195. See Consumer's Union, Rich House, POM House: The Two Faces of Home Equity 
Lending, Executive Summary, March 1997, http://www.consumersunion. 
org/finance/home-txl.htm and http://www.consumersunion.org/fi-
nance/home-tx2.htm. 
196. See supra note 158 and accompanying text. 
197. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1843(1)(2), 2903, 2906(b)(2). 
198. See Banking Law and Regulation, supra note 56, at 187. 
199. See id. at 187, 190-91. 
200. See supra Part I.B. 
201. Mansfield, supra note 33, at 559 (citing Karen Hube, In the Wild West of 
Subprime Lending, Borrowers Have to Dodge Many Bullets, WALL ST. J., March 
18,1998, at Cl). 
202. See Banking Law and Regulation, supra note 56, at 190-91. 
203. See generally id. (asserting that under the CRA, an "assessment area" within a 
"community" must consist of "whole geographics ... [and] may not arbi-
trarily exclude low- or moderate-income areas ... "). 
204. See discussion supra Part IV.C.2. 
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serve as an effective remedy? Second, the proposed recommendation 
ignores non-federally chartered lending institutions outside of the 
CRA's jurisdiction.205 Nevertheless, the need to enforce the CRA is a 
preexisting concern that Congress must address in light of changing 
banking practices.206 For example, the emergence of Internet bank-
ing discussed supra, in Part IV.C.l. Congress must understand the 
need for credit opportunities in light of predatory lending practices in 
the inner city, and reaffirm its commitment to enforcing the guiding 
principles of the CRA.207 This must occur in order for such a propo-
sal to take effect. Furthermore, abolishing usury limits in order to 
increase credit opportunities for borrowers with damaged credit is 
consistent with the view taken by a number of economists.208 For a 
number of years, economists have argued that usury limits reduce 
credit opportunities for those in need, particularly those with low in-
comes or poor credit.209 Individuals without access to credit because 
of such limits imposed on banks are therefore left to rely on "preda-
tory lenders. "210 The opinion set forth by economists is consistent 
with the underlying intent of the CRA.211 Abolishing usury and en-
forcing the CRA will bring banks back to low-income neighborhoods, 
making it unnecessary for residents to turn to subprime institutions to 
access credit.212 
Ideally, the presence of conventional lenders would drive away sub-
prime lenders targeting borrowers in the same neighborhood.213 Re-
sidents would be able to receive home equity loans at rates that 
accurately reflect the risk undertaken by the bank.214 The borrower is 
protected on two levels. First, multiple federal authorities would regu-
late the bank,215 thereby regulating underwriting standards, monthly 
205. See generally 12 U.S.C. §§ 2902(3), 2903(a) (applying eRA regulations only 
upon institution's application for federal charter); supra Part IV.C.1 (pro-
moting enforcement of the CRA). 
206. See discussion supra Part IV.C.l. 
207. See supra note 157 and accompanying text. But see supra Part IV.B for a 
discussion of federal regulation for proposed recommendations set forth by 
other consumer advocates. 
208. Banking Law and Regulation, supra note 56, at 158 cmt. 7. 
209. [d. 
210. [d. See also Forrester, supra note 102, at 446-48 (discussing economist theory 
regarding usury). 
211. See supra note 152 and accompanying text. 
212. [d. See also supra note 13 (discussing the exodus of banks from urban 
areas). 
213. See generally supra Part I.A (discussing low-income borrowers accepting sub-
prime lenders' loans because they have no other option in their 
neigh borhoods). 
214. Compare supra Part I.B (discussing conventional lenders' current inability to 
lend within the usury cap to high-risk borrowers) with Part II (discussing 
excessive rate-changing practices of subprime lenders). 
215. 12 U.S.C. § 2902 (West 2000) (listing authorities). 
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payments, and use of prepayment or balloon payments.216 Second, 
the borrower needing a second mortgage loan of any size could get 
just that: a second mortgage loan.217 Rather than refinancing the sec-
ond mortgage into a first mortgage loan, the borrower could obtain 
an affordable second mortgage that holds a second lien position on 
the borrower's home.218 
v. CONCLUSION 
The theory proposed above purports to return banks to neighbor-
hoods that desperately need the stability and credit opportunities that 
the bank's return would bring. Abolishing usury alone would not end 
predatory subprime lending practices.219 Yet, ending usury in combi-
nation with enforcing the Community Reinvestment Act, however, 
would offer low-income borrowers the opportunity to make meaning-
ful choices.22o Such enforcement would also offer conventional lend-
ers the opportunity to lend and set rates that accurately reflect risk. 221 
It is unclear whether curbing such abuses must come from a federal 
usury level,222 stricter guidelines for the Home Ownership and Equity 
Protection Act,223 or through enforcement of the CRA.224 What re-
mains clear, however, is that the subprime market was the only indus-
try that gained from Congress's enactment of the DIDMCA.225 
Enforcing the CRA would therefore allow low-income borrowers and 
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